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The truth of any economic theory ultimately hinges on the truth of its 
philosophy of man. In this essay I will analyze modern economic thought from 
two perspectives: firstly, from its criticism and development by experimental 
psychology; secondly, from the philosophical anthropology and Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas. I will argue that although there is much truth in modern 
economics, its philosophical underpinnings are flawed in important aspects, and 
this accounts for its inability to explain and understand human behavior in some 
significant respects. I will try to pinpoint the essential character of the 
philosophical error, and argue for a better philosophy of the person that can 
provide a starting point for building a new economics. 
 
Keywords 




The object of all economic enquiry is the human person under the aspect of 
behavior within limited resources. Consequently the truth of any economic 
theory ultimately hinges on the truth of its philosophy of man. In this essay I will 
analyze modern economic thought from two perspectives: firstly, from its 
criticism and development by experimental psychology; secondly, from the 
philosophical anthropology and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. 
I will argue that although there is much truth in modern economics, its 
philosophical underpinnings are flawed in important aspects, and this accounts 
for its inability to explain and understand human behavior in some significant 
respects. I will further argue that integrating psychology does not provide a 
solution to the current state of economics, especially insofar as modern 
psychology itself is influenced by the same philosophical mistakes. 
I will try to pinpoint the essential character of the philosophical error, and 
argue for a better philosophy of the person that can provide a starting point for 
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building a new economics. I will not study the matter exhaustively, but will only 
attempt to underscore some key concepts and assumptions, which I believe have 
not received enough little critical analysis. I will sketch at some potential 
avenues that may help to provide a better grounding, but my main hope is to 
stimulate further discussion and constructive criticism. 
 
Economics and psychology: some recent developments 
 
Economics is both an old and a young discipline. Its early origins as a 
science can be traced back at least to the Spanish scholastics of the 16
th century, 
who enquired into economic phenomena as part of their duties as moral 
theologians.
1 However, it was only in the 20
th century that economics acquired 
the importance and aura it holds in our society today. One is therefore not 
surprised to find that questions to do with the methodology and philosophy of 
economics are still 'work in progress'.  
The dominance of one paradigm – sometimes called 'neoclassical' 
economics – conceals the extent to which there is an ongoing debate on the right 
way of doing economics. However, recent literature in and around economics 
has witnessed a surge in discussion on the philosophical underpinnings of 
economic science. The most important challenges have come from experimental 
psychology, and they focus on two aspects of the human person: (1) the 
cognitive limits of human choice and (2) the moral character of human action. 
 
Physics, utility machines, and human behavior 
 
Economics (especially what is known as 'microeconomics') is essentially a 
behavioral science: it seeks to analyze, understand and predict human behavior, 
with special reference to the use of scarce material resources. The hard 
methodological question is how we ought to picture and model human behavior 
so as to make sense of it. Pure observations are, of course, of little use on their 
own, as philosophers of science tell us. 
Neoclassical models of economic behavior are broadly built on the models 
that seek to mimic models used in standard physics. The methodology focuses on 
(1) abstract, mathematical models of behavior and (2) empirical, mostly 
quantitative studies using statistical techniques (called 'econometrics'), which 
seeks to assess the validity of the abstract models. The behavioral assumptions 
that underlie the mathematical models are generally based on a utilitarian vision 
of man: man is pictured as a 'rational utility maximizer'. In theory, this can mean 
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a number of things, but in practice, most economists tend to assume for the sake 
of simplicity that people seek to maximize their material wealth, at least most of 
the time. 
This methodology has been attacked from various perspectives. The crux 
of the issue is whether the behavioral assumptions of so-called 'rational choice 
theory' are justifiable at all. Man is not the kind of 'economic machine' that the 
theory would have him to be. This is not merely a philosophical statement, but in 
other empirical sciences of man, especially psychology, it is well known that 
man is more complex than that. 
Experimental psychology raises at least two concerns. One is the cognitive 
imperfection of man, which means that our capacity for gathering, analyzing and 
interpreting data is limited. This often leads us to make decisions which 
mainstream economic theory would call 'irrational'. Many economists now 
accept this criticism, and the term 'bounded rationality' is often used to refer to 
this characteristic of real human behavior.
1 
The other issue is our knowledge of human motivation, which challenges 
the simplistic assumptions of economic theory. If our cognitive limitations reveal 
that we are in some sense 'worse' than the neoclassical homo economicus, then 
fortunately, the study of motivation and preferences presents a 'brighter' picture 
of man. 
Robert Frank, for example, writes about the challenge of cooperation and 
altruism.
2 In mainstream economic models, moral sentiments such as sympathy 
are assumed away, which suggests that men are unlikely to treat each other well 
unless they have economic incentives to do so. Frank however points out, citing 
extensive empirical research, that people are in reality far more cooperative and 
altruistic than neoclassical models would have it. People are not motivated solely 
by wealth or other selfish concerns, but are often willing to sacrifice material 
benefits for moral reasons and the good of others. 
Another economist in this field is Bruno Frey, who has studied personal 
motivation in such contexts as the workplace.
3 The 'principal-agent model' of 
mainstream economics tells us that employees will cheat their employer, shirk 
their responsibilities and look for purely personal gains, unless they are properly 
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monitored and given material incentives to work well. Frey demonstrates that the 
reality is more complicated. He marshals extensive research on 'intrinsic 
motivation' to show that although material incentives play a role, in many 
contexts people are more dedicated to their work when they feel trusted, 
respected and valued. In fact, overemphasizing extrinsic incentives (carrots and 
sticks) will in many cases cause a crowding-out of intrinsic motivation and lead 
to an overall decline in productivity. 
 
More money, more pleasure, yet not fulfilled 
 
In addition to trying to understand, describe and predict human behavior 
under the economic aspect, many economists are interested in the normative 
consequences of their research. Economics as a pure science does not tell us 
what we should do with the information we acquire, and indeed what kind of 
problems are worthy of study. These are essentially philosophical questions, but 
they have important and wide-ranging consequences. 
Most economics are not philosophers, of course. But their research does 
relate to philosophical issues and assumptions in various ways. This can be 
clearly seen in so-called 'welfare economics', which deals with the conditions for 
maximizing human welfare with given material resources. It tries to look beyond 
mere description of behavior, toward what kind of economic, social and political 
arrangements are good for the society. 
Not surprisingly, a central concept in welfare economics is efficiency. 
Efficiency can and has been defined in various ways in economics, but most 
mainstream economists would agree that economic efficiency is achieved when 
limited resources yield their maximum benefits, which in turn are understood in 
terms of subjective 'utility' or, for simplicity, 'wealth'. 
This line of thinking has more than theoretical relevance. It also justifies 
the dominant focus in economics on material well-being and economic growth. It 
influences economic policy in all its aspects, and implicitly many other political 
questions too, such as education, environmental policy, taxation, company law, 
labor law, and so on. Economic efficiency is also the defining feature of 
development policy. 
There is undoubtedly some sense in this drive towards the efficient use of 
limited resources. However, it is far more problematic philosophically than most 
economists think. The existence of multiple concepts of 'efficiency' within 
economics itself testifies to the suspect nature of the term. 
Research by psychologists has influenced this discussion too. Even a new 
branch of knowledge called 'happiness research' or has popped up.
1 Researchers 
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of the 'economics of happiness' try to find empirically stable factors that 
contribute to the subjective well-being of individuals. Some of their more 
famous arguments are that unemployment causes serious dissatisfaction 
regardless of material consequences; that greater wealth correlates poorly with 
greater happiness, and that local decision-making in politics makes citizens 
happier than centralized political structures. 
Happiness research has been widely criticized in turn.
1 Although may be 
helpful in identifying flaws in simplistic welfare economics, it depends on 
methodologically problematic assumptions. Questionnaire data that may be 
suspect and equating happiness with subjectively estimated well-being is 
philosophically highly problematic. The empirical stability and universalisability 
of the research is also in doubt. Thus it is a field of research that may provide 
helpful hints, but one should be cautious in relying too much on its claims. 
 
Key issues and challenges 
 
Getting under the skin: the need for an inside view 
 
The developments outlined above represent important steps toward a more 
realistic vision of man in economics. However, they also raise further questions 
which, I believe, they are not able to answer. Psychology can tell us only so 
much about human behavior. It can help us to identify behavioral regularities and 
tendencies that contradict the assumptions of mainstream economics, but it does 
not explain the reason for those tendencies. Like empirical economics, 
behavioral sciences look upon man 'from the outside', and the challenge is to get 
inside, to understand man 'from within'. 
The need to understand human behavior from within is not mere 
philosophical pedantry. A careful look at the history and methodology of 
economics reveals that getting an inside perspective to behavior has been a 
central concern and the key to the success of economics. By creating a model of 
the internal logic of human behavior with respect to choice in situations with 
multiple ends and scarce means, economics has built a theoretical basis for 
interpreting a wide range of social phenomena. Empirical research has played a 
role, but empirical studies would be practically meaningless without the 
theoretical basis. Note, moreover, that the argued flaws of mainstream 
economics can broadly be identified as errors (untruths) in the assumptions on 
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which the theoretical models are built; empirical studies are less relevant to this 
criticism. 
Psychology too makes assumptions about the human being. This is 
necessary for empirical research, and empirical findings in turn influence the 
assumptions. However, that loop is not perfect, and psychology cannot answer 
all the questions it poses. Psychology has not as of yet been able to build a 
competing theoretical basis for doing economics. It may be for this reason that 
the influence of psychology on economics has so far been modest. Most 
economists pay little or no attention to what psychologists have to say about 
behavior. They treat the findings as merely identifying certain 'anomalies' in 
human behavior (i.e. aspects that do not fit the theoretical models of economics). 
At most, these anomalies mean that we need to be a bit more cautious in 
applying our theoretical models into real cases, but nothing more than that. An 
better theory is needed, one that incorporates what is true in both 'old' and 'new' 
economics, and integrates them in a single, unified theory. That is yet to be 
achieved. 
 
Plunging into the deep: black boxes in utility machines 
 
Ultimately, questions dealing with the theoretical basis of economics turn 
on the philosophy of the human person. It is there in the deep waters of 
philosophy – where, unfortunately, most economists feel themselves utterly at 
loss
1 – that economics either succeeds or fails. Of course, the philosophy of man 
implicit in a practical science such as economics or psychology can be true in 
some respects and erroneous in others. 
I will argue that the philosophy of man implicit in mainstream economics 
is partially (but not entirely) mistaken. I will further submit that the assumptions 
implicit in most of experimental psychology today are in crucial respects similar 
to those in mainstream economics. This is why the insights of experimental 
psychology do not penetrate into, and challenge, the more fundamental issues in 
mainstream economics. 
The key idea is this. The homo economicus concept of modern economics 
was inherited from the thought of the English-speaking classics such as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo. Their vision of science was greatly inspired by the 
success of Newton's physics (just as mid-20
th century economists were 
influenced by later physics). This was easily combined with the utilitarian moral 
philosophy that was gaining ground in those days, a philosophy that presented 
                                                           
1  This is because modern training in economics is devoid of any philosophical thought and 
reflection. PhD economists know a great deal about formal mathematics, statistics and other 
'scientific' methods, but they have rarely opened a single book on philosophy.   40 
man as a machine in search of its utility: human choice is merely based on a 
calculus of pleasure and pain.
1 
The model of man as a utility machine is not entirely erroneous: man is 
built with a natural instinct for pursuing that which is pleasant and avoiding that 
which is unpleasant. This partial truthfulness of utilitarian thought may explain 
much of its success. However, the deep flaw in its vision of man is the way in 
which it understands rationality and the role of reason. This is also the key to 
understanding where modern economics goes astray. 
Modern economics understands rationality in a purely instrumental sense. 
Men are taken to be rational when they pursue their chosen ends (or 'utility' or 
'preferences') consistently and efficiently, given the resources available to them 
(modern economists give more precise, mathematical definitions, of course). 
However, the fundamental basis of choice – what prompted them to choose those 
ends – is left open, and is indeed implicitly assumed to be unknowable. 
Rationality pertains to the external expressions of choice only, whereas the inner 
dynamic of the person – his moral core, as it were – remains a mystery, a black 
box. 
The problems flowing from this black-box conception of choice and 
preferences are actually concealed by the ostensible simplicity of the homo 
economicus picture of man. People just pursue what they feel like, and that's it – 
nothing mysterious about it. It is not for us to judge the likings of others, it is 
presumed. 
The instrumental view of rationality was put more famous by David Hume: 
'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend 
to any other office than to serve and obey them'.
2 Hume's literally passionate 
assertion has wide-reaching consequences, and it makes explicit what is implicit 
in so much of modern thought, particularly economics. 
To reiterate, the neoclassical model of economic behavior leaves no room 
for the imperfections of human reason. This leads many economists to assume 
(explicitly or implicitly) that all choice necessarily makes the person better off; 
by their choices, people reveal their preference for that choice. True, life is hard 
and conditions may be difficult, but our failure to be completely satisfied lies 
outside of us, not in our opting for wrong or unhelpful ends. Not surprisingly, 
there is a tendency among many economists to embrace a certain kind of 
determinism, a denial of freedom of choice (economists do not necessarily think 
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this is true in real life, but it is still roughly correct and hence instrumentally 
useful for creating economic models). 
Psychology brings some realism – but only some. Research on our 
cognitive limitations reveals that the instrumental reason of man is not perfect. 
The imperfectability of instrumental reason can account for many of the 
'anomalies' in real behavior. It explains why men often choose suboptimal (or 
even completely irrational) means in pursuing their chosen ends. However, 
empirical psychology fails to open the black box. Insofar as it is purely empirical 
(and not genuinely philosophical), it lacks the conceptual tools and methods for 
entering into the inner realm of choice. Moreover, it would seem to me that most 
of modern psychology is just as much influenced by Hume's vision of human 
rationality as is economics. 
 
The dilemma of morality: caught in Hume's cage 
 
As far as morality and behavior are concerned, the key challenge seems to 
be, how we can account for freedom in moral choice. In other words, if reason is 
just a slave of the passions, as Hume said, then it seems that moral choice is 
determined by our inner impulses alone – appetite, fear, and other emotions and 
feelings. 
The problem can also be seen in Robert Frank's analysis of cooperation and 
altruism.
1 Frank's main goal is to demonstrate that economic models built on an 
assumption of narrow self-interest are unrealistic: they simply do not describe 
real human behavior. Now, some economists object that they can account for 
altruism and other kinds of seemingly unselfish traits by just including them in 
the 'utility function' (note here the excesses of the black-box approach to choice). 
However, Frank points out that this renders the entire method unscientific, 
because if one tries to explain everything away by calling it a 'taste for 
something' (e.g. altruism), one is not explaining anything at all. 
As a solution, Frank proposes a broader concept of self-interest, which 
includes the 'strategic value of moral emotions'. The basic idea is this: people can 
be self-interested in a broader sense, even when they behave unselfishly, because 
cooperation and altruism are at the end of day beneficial for the actor himself. 
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For example, someone who wants to do business must be able to acquire the trust 
of his partners, and that is difficult for people who are ruthlessly selfish. 
Now, that much can be included in the 'rational choice models' of the old 
economics: people are not selfish, but intelligently self-interested. Frank goes 
further than that, however. After all, experimental studies demonstrate that many 
people behave altruistically even in contexts where it is impossible for them to 
get any material benefit from their choice – for example, when the parties do not 
know each other, do not have any contact with each other during the experiment, 
and will not meet each other afterwards. This is a genuine anomaly for models of 
intelligent self-interest. 
This is why emotions matters. We are not perfectly rational, as psychology 
demonstrates, but our passions – including the moral emotions – direct our 
choice. An explanation for the moral emotions is offered by evolutionary 
psychology: we have been wired with emotions that foster cooperation, because 
that is helpful for our survival. However, the roots of Frank's argument lay 
beyond evolutionary psychology; they are actually found in the very works of 
David Hume and Adam Smith.
1 
The concept of moral emotions – such as altruism and sympathy, but also 
revenge and anger – is important and valuable. Clearly, some people are 
emotionally better disposed to cooperate than others. The question is, however, 
whether that is the whole picture of what morality is about. I would suggest that 
by rooting his analysis in the thought of Smith and Hume, Frank gets trapped in 
Hume's intellectual cage. 
The problem is this: how can we account for freedom in moral choice? If 
man is not truly free to choose between alternative moral options, what is the 
point of this discussion other than intellectual entertainment? 
For example, Frank talks about 'preference for cooperation'. To him that is 
a key prerequisite for success in social life, including business. However, in 
order to incorporate his theory into economic models, Frank treats this 
preference as something stable, even innate. But that implies that people do not 
have real freedom in moral choice. 
Frank does not deny that people can change their attitudes towards others. 
He notes that businesspeople use various methods for forging and signaling 
sympathy (which is necessary for cooperation): gift-giving, having a drink 
together, and using friends and relatives in business. He also points out that the 
emotional predispositions to cooperate can be altered by education; for example, 
it has been demonstrated that training in economics tends to make people more 
egoistic (as it creates rationalizations for selfishness by arguing that 'greed is 
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good'). But none of that is real freedom; man is changed purely from without, not 
by personal choice. 
The paradox is that as Frank attempts to incorporate moral emotions into 
the corpus of mainstream economics, he squeezes real life and ordinary 
experience out of morality. For example, he discusses at length the problem of 
commitment to marriage, and points out that emotional bonding is the best way 
to ensure commitment. But commitment to marriage is in Frank's analysis 
framed in pure cost-benefit terms, just like in business relationships. That is not 
only morally problematic in the eyes of those who hold a higher opinion of 
marriage, but it is also dangerous in practice. As Frank himself notes, studies 
show that when therapists encourage people to think about their relationships in 
cost-benefit terms, it tends to backfire. This strikes the root of Frank's approach 
to morality: when morality is analyzed within the philosophical framework of 
Smith and Hume, it can be incorporated into mainstream economics, but its true 
character gets distorted. 
 
Pleasure, wealth, and the paradox of systematic sorrow 
 
The philosophical roots of economics are also reflected in normative issues 
and the question of happiness. Mainstream economics posits a perfect 
instrumental reason and a non-existent moral reason. In other words, reason does 
not guide moral judgment; it simply helps in execution. Ethically, this means that 
people should be allowed and enabled to pursue their desires to the maximal 
extent possible (perhaps tempered by J. S. Mill's 'harm principle'). Politically, 
this leads to an overemphasis of the importance of economic efficiency and 
growth: the more material means we have at are reach, the higher levels of 
satisfaction we can attain. 
The trouble is that, clearly, the reality is not so simple. Pleasure, money 
and endless cachets do not make people happy, whereas people are capable of 
true fulfillment even in the midst of material poverty. That is difficult to explain 
from the point of view of economic theory. It is particularly difficult to 
understand how some people can be systematically unhappy. 
Adding cognitive limits to the picture helps a bit. It explains why people 
can fail to choose the best means for pursuing their chosen ends – pleasure, 
wealth, power or any other proxies of human satisfaction. However, it cannot 
deal with the failure of some to pursue the right goals – those ends that 
contribute to genuine human fulfillment. It seems that the systematic 
unhappiness of some persons is a bit of a mystery. The only solution is to blame 
the surroundings, the difficult circumstances – or, invoking evolutionary 
psychology, to blame one's genetic errors for unhelpful moral emotions. 
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New foundations: philosophical anthropology of Aristotle and Aquinas 
 
Hume's mistake: passions and reason 
 
It is surprising that despite the fame of Hume's statement on the 
relationship between reason and the passions, Hume's original argument for it is 
so awkward as to hardly merit even discussion. It seems to be equally difficult to 
find in later authors any real defense for the belief that reason can only be a slave 
of the passions, and especially that such a state of affairs is morally laudable. 
Common sense alone would suggest otherwise. We are, at the very least, 
capable of experiencing ourselves as being truly free to choose between different 
moral options. The fact that we experience moral dilemmas and can repent of 
past choices attests to the fact that we are making real choices between mutually 
exclusive visions of right and wrong. The dynamic of moral choice is not a 
matter of the intellect alone, but reasoning and intellectual deliberation is 
certainly an important part of it. That is why we sometimes ask our friends and 
companions for advice in specifically moral matters ('do you think this course of 
action is okay?' or 'should I be working for this company?'), and we expect 
guidance that goes beyond the merely technical and consequential. 
All of this common experience implies that we are in fact capable of 
controlling and directing our passions, feelings and emotions. Sometimes we do 
it better than other times. We can personally sense a real and fundamental 
difference between times when we allowed ourselves to be swayed by our 
passions (e.g. eating another piece of cake even though we knew we would feel 
bad afterwards) and times when we freely chose to pursue that which was truly 
good. 
Those who deny the possibility of a non-instrumental, or moral, capacity in 
human rationality can merely claim that I am being fooled by my experience, 
that my sense of freedom is an illusion. Yet just the contrary would seem to be 
the case, namely that it is they who are being deceived by their distorted reason. 
The simple question is what kind of explanatory model makes more sense of the 
data and on this Hume's assertion fails entirely. (Frankly, the only way I can 
personally account for the reluctance of some persons to acknowledge this is that 
they do not want to believe in the moral powers of the human spirit, perhaps 
because they are emotionally attached to some fleeting source of pleasure which 
they erroneously do not want to give up so that they could aim for the higher 
things.)
1 
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Virtues, goods and fulfilment 
 
But if we do acknowledge a greater capacity for the human spirit, then a 
radically different picture of man is exposed. I will call this picture of man the 
philosophical anthropology of Aristotle and Aquinas, as these two great minds 
were perhaps the leading figures in fully articulating a complete philosophy of 
man.
1 
The human person, according to Aristotle and Aquinas, is not endowed 
with perfect rationality, but a rationality that despite its limitations is capable of 
controlling the totality of the person. Thus reason need not remain a slave of the 
passions, and it must not become content with such a state, because the reduction 
of human reason to the purely instrumental is not only a sign of moral weakness 
but also a sure cause for personal misery. In contrast, the triumph of the rightly 
ordered reason within the person is the basis of true fulfillment. 
In ancient Greek and Medieval ethics, social relations played only a small 
part. This was because morality was primarily seen as something personal: it is 
not what you do to others, but what – through your moral choices – you do to 
yourself. Moral choices ordinarily (but not always) have external manifestations 
that have a bearing upon others, but that is secondary to how we shape ourselves 
and hence our own happiness through our choices between right and wrong. It 
was on the basis of such a vision of morality that Socrates was able to say with 
full conviction: 'So the unjust man, like every man who possesses bad things, is 
pitiable in every way’.
2 
In modern times the ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas are also known as 
virtue ethics. More than a moral philosophy, it is a complete philosophical 
anthropology, a vision of what man is like, how the inner dynamic of human 
choice operates, and what man needs in order to attain happiness. The key 
insight of this theory is that man is neither a clever beast nor an angelic non-
beast. He is capable of both good and evil. Our passions are neither good nor evil 
in themselves, but only depending on the ends to which they are directed. For 
example, the desire for food is good insofar as it directs our attention to the 
necessary preservation of corporeal life, but bad when it goes over the board to 
gluttony. 
The mere satisfaction of bodily desires is not what makes the person 
happy, but when then really provides lasting fulfillment is a complex question, as 
it is not an easy task to make explicit all the aspects of the problem. This article 
cannot go into details on that. However, let us briefly make reference to some of 
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the insights of philosophers such as John Finnis and Germain Grisez, who started 
what came to be known as the 'new natural law' theory.
1 They built on the 
thought of Aquinas and other classics, but incorporated insights from more 
recent literature, including anthropology. 
On the basis of their investigations, these authors concluded that there are 
several 'basic human goods'. These are the basic and fundamental reasons for any 
human action. They include at least the following (but the list is by no means 
exhaustive): life, truth, friendship, aesthetic experience, skillful play, religion, 
and practical reasonableness. None of them alone is the key to human happiness, 
but instead they are all aspects of integral human fulfillment. We are capable of 
identifying them as such through personal reflection; moreover, one can find 
them mirrored in anthropological literature on diverse human cultures. Many 
goods – food, money, and so on – are ultimately just means for participating in 
the basic goods. The same is true of the human passions (attitudes toward 
pleasure and pain): they help man to act so as to participate in the basic goods – 
although, as mentioned earlier, they do so properly only when controlled by the 
rightly ordered reason. 
In view of this, the fundamental problem with 'happiness research' 
becomes clear: in the terminology employed by the philosophical tradition of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, 'happiness' (understood as that which all men aspire to) is 
never equated with mere ‘sense of satisfaction'. Satisfaction can mean a number 
of things, including the mere attainment of sensual pleasure, as while eating a 
cake, but that is very different from our integral fulfillment as human persons. 
 
Conclusion: Returning to the foundations 
 
The way we approach economics depends on our understanding of man. 
Doing economics with the philosophy of Aristotle and Aquinas would have a 
number of consequences. On the one hand, it would challenge the current 
foundational concepts of economics, such as utility, preferences, efficiency, 
growth  and  development. This is not just a question of what importance we 
should give to, say, economic efficiency and growth, but also what we actually 
mean by them. 
Take for example the concept of efficiency. In economics it generally 
refers to the ability of a process or arrangement to produce the maximum amount 
of profits (or some other goods). In practice, there have been various attempts to 
give more precise and practical definitions that could be used in normative 
analysis. The failure of any specific definition to stand out seems to be reflective 
                                                           
1  See for example John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
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of the fact that, frankly, it is quite senseless even to try to define efficiency both 
generally and specifically at the same time. 
The same is true of economic development. This is commonly equated 
with the growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a figure that estimates 
the total production of an economy. The obvious problem with that is that the 
sheer availability of a multitude of products may not be a good estimate of the 
well-being of the society – nor of the opportunities available to individuals for 
participating in basic human goods such as friendship, truth and aesthetic 
experience. 
Genuine economic development – and true economic growth – means not 
that the limited resources are used to satisfy the aggregated desires of individuals 
to the maximum extent, but that those resources are used well and wisely at the 
service of the real good of all persons. The employment of new technologies, 
more flexible arrangements and healthy competition may be part of that, but they 
alone will not necessarily channel the productive efforts of men and women to 
those purposes that matter most. For that, personal virtues and a sound moral 
ecology are needed. 
The transformation of economics starts with the foundational concepts, but 
it proceeds towards specific branches of research. This includes, at least, 
microeconomic theory in most of its aspects. For example, the study of economic 
cooperation must go beyond the merely emotional side of morality. As we saw 
earlier, an exclusive attention to the moral emotions is ultimately misleading, 
because it blinds us from the broader perspective. In light of the new natural law 
theory, for example, sympathy and altruism are not mere 'strategies' for obtaining 
benefits from others; they are crucial ingredients for genuine human 
relationships, for friendship and love – and unlikely purely material gains, these 
are constitutive aspects of human fulfillment. Morality is cannot be merely 'not 
irrational after all'; in contrast, an exclusive focus on the egoistic and the material 
is itself unreasonable. 
To finish, let us take note of what Pope John Paul II once said about 
economic development: 'The moral causes of prosperity [...] reside in a 
constellation of virtues: industriousness, competence, order, honesty, initiative, 
frugality, thrift, spirit of service, keeping one’s word, daring—in short, love for 
work well done. No system or social structure can resolve, as if by magic, the 
problem of poverty outside of these virtues.'
1 
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